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1 Introduction
During the European sovereign debt crisis bond markets experienced unprecedented yield
changes.1 Asset pricing models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets predict
that wealth effects (yield changes) result in rebalancing (examples include; Cochrane et al.,
2008; Chabakauri; 2013 and Judd et al., 2013). Moreover, there is an extensive literature
that documents the existence of flight-to-safety and flight-to-liquidity in times of market
stress (e.g., Beber et al., 2009; Longstaff, 2004; Garcia and Gimeno, 2014 and Beck et al.,
2016). The existence of flights is suggestive of investor rebalancing.2 Additionally, the
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Figure 1: Volume, Bid-ask Spreads and Yield spreads
Panel A of Figure 1 displays the time series of the daily sum of Euro volume, the volume weighted bid-ask
spreads of all Spanish bonds in our sample and the yield spread between 10 year Spanish and German
government bonds (scaled by the yield of the German bond) over the first quarter of 2008. Panel B of Figure
1 displays average quarterly Euro volume, volume weighted bid-ask spread of our sample (all countries)
and the mean (across countries) yield spread over 10 year Bunds. The dashed lines: (1) March 6, 2008
(MBS downgrades), (2) August 2007 (start of interbank crisis), (3) March 2008 (MBS downgrades and Bear
Stearns), (4) September 2008 (Lehman), (5) April 2010 (S&P downgrades Greece to junk), (6) November
2010 (Austerity referendum in Greece), (7) April 2011 (Portugal requests EU bailout), (8) July 2012 (Draghi
“whatever it takes”). For a more detailed description of the variables see section 3 and Figure 5.
empirical literature documents a link between volatility and trading volume (e.g., Chordia,
et al., 2007; Huang and Wang, 2011).3 Thus, these three strands of literature predict
1The sovereign bond yields in the GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) countries reached
the highest levels since the introduction of the Euro. The 10 year yield for Spanish and Italian bonds peaked
at 7.4% and 7.5%, respectively. The yields in Ireland, Portugal and Greece reached even higher levels of
12.0%, 18.1% and 49.3%, respectively.
2For example, on July 14, 2011, the Financial Times commented on the widening of the yield gap between
France and Germany in the following way “Economists put the widening gap down to a flood of investors
into German debt.” http:www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fb9cc4d4-ae24-11e0-a2ab-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4Ii8Yc4Vv
3Foster and Viswanathan (1993) report that the 1987 stock market crash was associated with abnormally
high trading activity.
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massive investor rebalancing during the sovereign debt crisis and hence abnormal trading
volume.4
[Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 here]
This paper examines the trading behavior - primarily volume - of sovereign bond markets
in times of stress. Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates the trading volume of Spanish government
bonds during the first quarter of 2008. The graph displays a striking pattern, in the five
trading days before March 6, the total daily volume was on average EUR 797.6 million,
but in the five trading days afterwards (the week prior to the collapse of Bear Stearns)
the total volume was on average EUR 109.8 million, a drop of 86.2%. The low trading
volume persisted for several months. At that time there were growing concerns about
prime structured credit products.5,6 These concerns spilled over to financial institutions
and CDS spreads of market makers in the sovereign bond market increased by 19.7% from
March 5 to March 7. These fears were incorporated into bid-ask spreads. The mean bid-ask
spread for Spanish sovereign debt was on average 13.8 bps over the five trading days prior
to March 6. On March 6 they roughly tripled to 39 bps and remained elevated until the
end of April. Thus, this is suggestive of concerns about structured products resulting in
financial intermediaries having a reduced capacity or willingness to bear risk. This led to a
substantial increase in trading costs (consistent with the evidence in Pelizzon et al., 2016)
which in turn resulted in a market freeze.7 To illustrate that this episode generalizes, Panel
B of Figure 1 displays quarterly volume, the volume weighted bid-ask spreads and yield
4There are multiple other reasons to expect abnormal trading volume during crisis times. For example,
changes in frictions (such as private information, Kyle, 1985), margin calls leading to a liquidity spiral
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) and interbank market frictions that result in liquidity pull-back (Nyborg
and Östberg, 2014) can justify increased trading volume during times of crises.
5Between March 5 and March 7, Moody’s downgraded structured credit products of multiple issuers worth
USD 14.5 billion. Among the downgraded products were senior tranches and some of them were downgraded
up to eight notches (Aaa to Baa2). At the same time the four major rating agencies downgraded 166 financial
institutions (including subsidiaries).
6To make sure that the pattern in Figure 1 does not represent a shift from one trading venue to another
or data errors we consider other data sources. Panel A of Figure 2 plots trading volume from data obtained
from an alternative Spanish trading platform (Sistema Electrónico de Negociación de Activos Financieros,
SENAF). Also, Spanish primary dealers are obliged to report trades to the Bank of Spain. Panel B plots
the reported volume (from the Mercado de Deuda Pública Anotada, MDPA dataset) which unlike MTS
volume also includes customer to dealer trades, interdealer trading on all trading platforms as well as OTC
trades. The decrease in volume is observed in the alternative datasets. In addition, Engle, Fleming, Ghysels
and Nguyen (2012) observe a drop in trading volume in the U.S. Treasury market following the Lehman
bankruptcy.
7Market maker risk bearing capacity is likely affected by funding costs (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009)
and the functioning of interbank markets (Nyborg and Östberg, 2014) whereas market maker willingness is
likely affected by changes in uncertainty.
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spreads for our sample. Overall, volume is significantly reduced during the sovereign debt
crisis, while bid-ask spreads and yield spreads are significantly elevated.
This illustrates that the view that stress results in large scale rebalancing (i.e., trading)
potentially needs to be qualified. In this paper we argue that one has to consider market
micro structure effects of market stress to completely understand the dynamics of trading
activity. Several central market microstructure models imply that bid-ask spreads (trans-
action cost channel) are likely to increase in times of stress due to increases in asymmetric
information (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), increases in credit risk / inventory risk (Stoll,
1978, Pelizzon et al., 2016) and decreases in risk bearing capacity (Ho and Stoll, 1981).
Additionally, Epps (1976) and Lo et al. (2004) find that increases in bid-ask spreads result
in reductions in volume. Thus, these models imply that stress results in reduced volume.
In this paper we examine the relation between market stress and volume in the European
sovereign bond market. First, we document that stress in the European sovereign bond
market is associated with significantly reduced trading volume. To define stress we adapt
the flight measure by Baele et al. (2013), which is developed to study flights from equity
markets to bond markets, to capture flights within the European sovereign debt market
from the periphery to the core (Germany). We examine volume around these stress events
using event study methodology in the spirit of Kandel and Pearson (1995). We find that
trading volume is approximately reduced by 32.6% during the stress events.
Second, we find evidence for the existence of both the bid-ask spread and the rebalancing
channel. In the event study analysis we document that volume is particularly low if the
stress is severe or associated with high bid-ask spreads. For market stress events in low
bid-ask spreads periods we find evidence of volume increasing (suggestive of rebalancing).
We run cross-sectional regressions using our events and further document the existence of
these two opposing effects. High yield spreads are positively related to volume (consistent
with wealth effects resulting in rebalancing), while high bid-ask spreads are associated with
lower volume.
Third, we verify that a reduction in risk bearing capacity of market makers leads to
increased bid-ask spreads and therefore reduced trading volume. Intuitively the reduction
of risk bearing capacity depends on the exposure of the market makers’ balance sheet to the
stress event. On MTS a bond may be traded on a domestic and a pan-European platform
3
implying that the set of market makers differs.8 Market making in domestic markets is
mainly facilitated by domestic banks. Potential reasons for this concentration include home
bias (French and Poterba, 1991) and moral suasion (Ongena et al., 2016).9 Consequently the
balance sheet exposure of market makers in the domestic market to (domestic) stress events
is significantly higher. Using within bond variation and difference-in-difference regressions
we show that bid-ask spreads rise more and volume falls more on the domestic platform.
Next, in an aggregate time-series setting we trace the effects of aggregate shocks on
volume through the rebalancing and transaction cost channel. This is done by first estimat-
ing the sensitivity of yield spreads (rebalancing channel) and bid-ask spreads (transaction
cost channel) to the aggregate shocks and subsequently relating trading volume to our two
channels. Shocks that impair the risk-bearing capacity of market makers, such as, market
maker CDS spreads and interbank market frictions are transmitted to volume predomi-
nantly through their effect on bid-ask spreads. On the other hand shocks in the equity
market that are mainly associated with wealth effects seem to be transmitted to volume
mainly via the rebalancing channel.
While the difference-in-difference analysis exploits that the market makers on different
platforms differ in their exposure to the stress event the time series regressions use the
fact that different types of shocks have differential impact on the risk bearing capacity.
Overall, we find that in this market during the sovereign debt crisis the transaction cost
channel dominates rebalancing motives. Further, our findings suggest that the close relation
between the stress events and market maker balance sheets impacts risk bearing capacity
to such an extent that the resulting increase in bid-ask spreads curtails trading.
Previous research in U.S. Treasury markets has shown that volume is generally positively
related to volatility (Huang and Wang, 2011), macroeconomic announcements (Fleming and
Remolona, 1997 and Beber and Brandt, 2009) and jumps (Jiang, Lo and Verdelhan, 2011).10
Consistent with this trading activity in the U.S. treasury market increased substantially
during the LTCM crisis (Furfine and Remolona, 2005) and during flight-to-safety episodes
8The average number of market makers on the domestic platform is 12.6 compared to 9.2 on the pan-
European platform.
9For example in Italy 24.8% of the market makers are Italian banks while on average in the other markets
Italian banks constitute only 4.68% of the market makers.
10Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1993) and Chordia, Huh and Sub-
rahmanyam (2007) report similar findings for equity markets. On p. 712 Chordia et al. (2007) note “The
results show that higher positive and more negative returns substantially increase trading activity. In other
words, the more extreme the returns (positive or negative), the higher is the trading activity. Overall, these
results are consistent with portfolio rebalancing [...].”
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(Engle, Fleming, Ghysels and Nguyen, 2012). There are several potential reasons for our
results difffering. First, they study flights from the equity market to the treasury market
while we study flights within the European sovereign bond market. In their context the
transaction cost channel is less important since a flight episode is characterized by a drop
in equity returns and an increase in bond prices. Put differently, we study the volume of
the shocked market (where the price drop occurs) whereas they study volume of the safe
market (which experiences a price increase). Second, arguably the U.S. treasury market
was less affected by the European sovereign debt crisis. Third, sovereign market stress
is likely to affect European market makers more since European banks (which are often
market makers) hold more domestic sovereign debt than their U.S. counterparts.11
Interestingly, Fleming and Remolona (1999) who study the U.S. treasury market sur-
rounding macro announcements find evidence in favour of volume both increasing and de-
creasing. In the minute after the news release uncertainty is high and market makers protect
themselves by increasing bid-ask spreads ultimately resulting in a lull in trading volume. In
the next minute and over the following one and half hours trading volume, price volatility,
and bid-ask spreads are elevated. In contrast our results suggest that market makers in the
European sovereign bond market have reduced risk bearing capacity for extended periods
resulting in persistent freezes (at least an entire trading week).
Previous work has documented an ambiguous relation between liquidity and volume.12
Our perspective that stress events affect both the rebalancing and transaction cost chan-
nel can rationalize these findings. Intuitively, in the European sovereign debt market the
transaction cost channel is likely to dominate since there are few liquidity providers that
have significant exposure to the stress events.
A recent paper by Bessembinder et al. (2017) documents a significant reduction in dealer
capital commitment in the US corporate bond market during the financial crisis and the
post-crisis period and a decrease in volume. We complement their work by running a horce
race between the rebalancing and transaction cost channels to determine when and why
freezes occur. They primarily study capital commitment (which they have excellent data
11The Bruegel database of sovereign bond holdings (the database covers Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain,
France, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, UK and US) developed by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) shows
that European domestic banks hold on average 22.4% of the outstanding sovereign bonds while the corre-
sponding number for U.S. banks is 2.8%.
12Fleming (2003) reports that in the US Treasury market “both high and low levels of trading activity are
associated with periods of poor liquidity.” Ranaldo et al. (2013) also conclude that “the relation between
liquidity and trading activity is ambiguous.”
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on) as the outcome while we study the consequences of decreases in capital comittment by
focusing on volume and we are able to link the reduction in trading volume to an increase
in transaction costs since we have access to quote data.
There is a growing literature that studies flight-to-liquidity and flight-to-quality in
sovereign bond markets. Longstaff (2004) and Favero et. al (2010) study the flight-to-
liquidity / flight-to-quality premium in yields. Beber et al. (2009) and García and Gimeno
(2014) study these premia along with order imbalances. Given that our goal is to gauge
the relative importance of the rebalancing and the transaction cost channel we need to
study volume since order imbalances will mechanically be associated with selling pressure
in falling markets that do not necessarily represent large-scale rebalancing.13
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and section 3
our variables. Section 4 contains our results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
Our main data source is high frequency trade and quote data from the electronic interdealer
platform MTS, covering the period from April 2003 to December 2014. Data from MTS
provides a comprehensive picture of the European sovereign bond market since the majority
of trading occurs on electronic trading platforms of which MTS has the largest market
share.14 MTS volume is representative of overall market volume since it is highly correlated
with volumes figures reported by primary dealers (the reported data is at a more aggregate
level and often at lower frequencies).15
The MTS dataset is organized into three types of files available on a monthly basis: the
13As an extreme example imagine a market with only one trade that is classified as being driven by a
sale, the order imbalance would indicate extreme selling pressure, but the market is rather characterized by
extreme illiquidity. Thus, we can have the same order imbalances at high or low trading volume since it is
scaled by dollar volume or the number of trades.
14According to industry research (Deutsche Bank, 2005) more than 95% of the bond trading takes place
off-exchange. It finds that about 75% of orders and around 50% of volume is traded on electronic trading
platforms in Europe. Dunne et al. (2010) estimate that MTS has a market share of 60.8% of the electronic
trading. Own calculations using a report from primary dealers in Portugal (published by the Portuguese
Treasury and Government Debt Agency) verify that MTS has indeed a high overall market share of volume
(73.9% of the Portuguese electronic trading).
15Data from the French and Portugeese national treasury agencies as well as the Bank of Spain also include
customer-dealer and non-MTS interdealer trading by primary dealers. The correlation between MTS volume
and the total market volume (as reported by the Agence France Trésor) is 0.72 in France (based on monthly
data), 0.90 in Portugal (based on monthly data) and 0.57 in Spain (based on daily data). Figure 4 shows
the close co-movement between the transaction volume in the electronic, interdealer and the customer-dealer
markets for the French sovereign bond market.
6
reference files which contain bond characteristics as well as the fills and best proposal files
that contain all the trades and quote updates with millisecond timestamps. We use this
data to calculate yields, volume and the cost of trading (bid-ask spreads).
[Insert Figure 4 here]
In screening the reference files we only consider bonds that are issued by a central
government. That is, we exclude ISINs where the issuer is classified as quasi-government,
local government or corporate. Also, we exclude bonds for which we have no information
on the issuer even though they are categorized as they were issued by a central government.
We keep bonds issued by countries that have data coverage over the entire sample period
(i.e., we exclude Denmark, Poland, Slovenia and the United Kingdom). This leaves us with
the following 11 European countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Spain
(ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands
(NL) and Portugal (PT). Additionally we only keep fixed and zero-coupon bonds. That is,
we exclude bonds with floating or indexed coupons and bonds with derivative features. To
facilitate the yield curve estimations (see below) we exclude the 16 bonds that at any point
in time during our sample have more than 40 years to maturity. All trades that are made
by national treasury agencies are recorded under a separate ISIN code. Since these trades
do not reflect investor rebalancing we eliminate them from the sample.
When we merge the monthly reference files we occasionally observe information that
should be time-invariant (e.g., issuer category) changing. In such cases we look up the
information in other data sources (DataStream, Bloomberg and Findex) for that particular
ISIN.16 If the information cannot be verified then the particular bond is dropped. Applying
these screens implies that we have a total of 3,181 bonds.
Next we merge the resulting reference file information with the best proposal files. In
total we have 1.12 billion quote updates and 1.28 million bond-days at this point. We drop
16For the variable issuer country nine bonds were misclassified resulting in five changes and four drops. In
case of the variable issuer type 34 bonds (33 dropped and one changed) were sorted into the wrong category.
A total of 17 bonds were classified as coupon bonds even though they are index-linked bonds and were thus
dropped. For the variable issue date 36 bonds had multiple entries (33 were changed and three deleted
because verification was not possible). The variable coupon rate was sometimes missing and thus replaced
by the coupon rate that was present in the reference files of the other months. In six cases we made changes
to bonds with multiple coupon rates. Lastly we changed 37 first coupon dates. Details are available upon
request. We found that the reference file for May 2003 had a significant amount of errors so we filled in data
for May 2003 with data from June 2003 when it was identical to the record for April 2003. If this was not
the case we used external sources to try to reconcile the records.
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quotes were the mid price is missing, either the bid or ask price is 999 (error code) and
quotes which imply negative bid-ask spreads (together these screens lead to a loss of 0.03%
of the quotes). In April 2003 we occasionally observe inconsistencies in the order book (we
observe three layers) in terms of sorting of the best bid and ask prices (e.g., the best bid
price is smaller than the second best bid price). In these instances we drop these quotes
(0.05% of the quotes). Additionally, we only consider quotes during regular trading hours
(8:15 am to 5:30 pm which is referred to as the open market phase by MTS; this leads to a
loss of 0.57% of the quotes).17 We also drop quotes that imply a relative bid-ask spread in
excess of 0.6 (this implies a loss of 414,531 quotes or 0.04% of the quotes).
We also exclude bond-days that occur during grey market trading (0.2% of the bond-
days). Moreover we exclude bonds that have less than 30 days to maturity (2.4% of the
bond-days). To remove quotes that are unlikely to reflect market wide liquidity changes
we drop bond-days where the price changes (from close to close, in %) are five times larger
than those of the entire country and the absolute price changes additionally exceed 4% on
the day in question and reverses at least 4% the next day (a loss of 0.1% of bond-days).18
Moreover we exclude dates that are in the dataset but are not regular trading days.
These dates are 28th of May 2007 (Whitsunday), the 24th of December as well as the 31st
of December in the years 2003, 2004 and 2007 (on these days overall trading volume in the
European sovereign bond market was roughly one hundredth of the normal level). Similarly
we drop two Saturdays that are present in the dataset (January 17, 2009 and November 22,
2008). After these screens we are left with a sample of 1.1 billion quote updates, 3.5 million
trades, 1.2 million bond-days and 2,937 unique bonds.
This dataset is the basis from which we calculate our main variables: trading volume,
bid-ask spreads and yields. All of these quantities are calculated per day and country.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Row (1) and (2) of Panel A, Table 1 provide descriptive statistics of the total number of
trading days and bonds across our sample countries. We have a time-series of 2,957 trading
days from April 2003 to December 2014 (covering both crisis and pre-crisis periods).19
17We ignore quotes from the pre market phase and the offer phase. For further information see London
Stock Exchange Group: General MTS Domestic Market Rules, Effective as of 4th April 2016.
18We remove these extreme idiosyncratic price movements that subsequently reverse since they are likely
to adversely affect convergence in our yield curve estimations.
19The only exception is Greece where we have 2,602 days because a lack of valid bid-ask spreads during
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Larger countries with significant amount of debt outstanding such as France, Germany, Italy
and Spain have more bonds in our sample (between 334 and 874) while smaller countries
have fewer bonds (e.g., 33 in Austria, 27 in Finland, and 61 in Ireland).
Rows (3) to (7) of Panel A, Table 1 present the daily average number of bonds, trades
and quotes as well as average trade size and Euro volume. On average we observe between
8.72 (IE) and 85.66 (FR) bonds per day. This cross-section of bonds allows to almost always
estimate a daily country specific yield curve (see below). There is ample variation in the
amount of trades across our sample countries (from an average of 5.59 to 734.16 trades per
day in Ireland and Italy, respectively). The daily cross-country average number of trades
is 108.72 (the last column). Even though the absolute number of trades is small in some
countries, given that the trade sizes in this market are substantial (mean cross-country trade
size is EUR 7.77 million), the mean daily Euro trading volume is large (EUR 38.99 in Ireland
to EUR 4,029.84 million in Italy). The large number of quote updates per day (between
7,390 in Ireland and 82,610 in Italy) provides us with ample number of observations to
calculate daily average bid-ask spreads.
On the MTS platform designated market makers are obliged to continuously quote firm
bid- and ask prices for at least five hours a day. From Panel B of Table 1 we see that for
the average bond in our sample there are 12.85 market makers (the mean number of market
makers ranges from 8.35 in Spain to 15.45 in Portugal). In addition to the market makers,
there are on average between 33.29 and 78.09 market takers that can post market orders.
Moreover MTS defines a minimum quantity (cross-country average of EUR 7.45 million)
that market makers have to quote to ensure depth. Pagano and von Thadden (2004) argue
that the minimum quantity and the obligatory continuous quotes of bid-ask spreads result
in the Euro MTS being the most important trading venue for European sovereign bonds.20
In Panel C of Table 1 we display the S&P ratings of our countries at the beginning and
the end of the sample period. The sample is characterized by variation in credit quality
across sovereigns and over time (many sovereigns experienced downgrades).
the height of the sovereign debt crisis.
20Additionally, it is the premier choice of academics: Bai, Juliard and Yuan (2012), Beber, Brandt and
Kavajecz (2009); Caporale and Girardi (2013); Caporale, Girardi and Paesani (2012); Cheung, de Jong, and
Rindi (2005); Darbha and Dufour (2013); Dufour and Nguyen (2008); Dufour and Skinner (2004); Dunne,
Hau and Moore (2010); Dunne, Moore and Portes (2006); Favero, Pagano and von Thadden (2010); Garcia
and Gimeno (2014); Gerlach, Schulz and Wolff (2010); Girardi (2008); Girardi and Impenna (2013); Pagano
and von Thadden (2004); Paiardini (2010); Pelizzon, Subrahmanyan, Tomio and Uno (2016) and Schneider,
Lillo, and Pelizzon (2016) all use the MTS data set for their empirical analysis.
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3 Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Volume
For each trade on the MTS platform we observe the price, the timestamp and the notional
amount traded. We use this to calculate Euro volume per trade and sum up the volume over
all trades within a country and day (similarly we calculate the number of bonds traded).
To facilitate comparison of volume across countries (given the large heterogeneity) we scale
volume with the average volume over the previous five days and can therefore interpret it
as abnormal volume. Our relative volume measure (RV OL) is defined as:
RV OLt = log(V OLt)− 15
5∑
l=1
log(V OLt−l), (1)
where V OLt is either the euro volume of a particular country or the total volume of all
countries excluding Germany (sample volume) during day t. Germany is excluded because
it is our reference country when classifying flights. In calculating the measure we use the
log transformation of volume (as in Dong, 2012) since it implies a symmetric measure.21
This measure can be interpreted as a percentage change if the difference in the two logs is
sufficiently small.
[Insert Table 2 here]
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Table 2, Panel A contains the descriptive statistics of the time series of the volume ratio
(RV OL). For the individual countries the means range from -0.0061 (GR) to -0.0006 (IE)
and the sample average is -0.0009. In fact all the means for all of our sample countries are
very close to zero, but slightly negative. This reflects that volume is marginally decreasing
over our sample period. Positive medians combined with the fact that negative extremes
(minimum) are larger, in absolute terms, than positive extremes (maximum) suggest that
our time series are characterized by large infrequent drops in volume. This pattern is also
visible in Figure 5. Additionally, the extreme values show that there are days with very high
or very low volume (compared to the previous five days) suggesting the potential existence
of both extensive rebalancing activity and freezes.
21Without the log transformation RV OL would be restricted to the range of [-100%,+∞] implying a
potential positive bias. Applying the log transformation leads to the symmetric range of [−∞,+∞]. In the
rare occasion that the daily total volume is zero we set the trading volume to be one since the log of zero is
not defined.
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3.2 Bid-Ask Spreads
In the MTS dataset we observe the first three layers of the order book. We use the best
bid and the best ask prices to calculate transaction costs. For each quote we calculate the
relative bid-ask spread (BAS) as the difference between the best ask-price PA and the best
bid-price PB divided by the mid price PM (the mid price is the average of the bid and the
ask price). We aggregate this to a daily bid-ask spread for each bond by calculating the
equally weighted average over all Ki,t updates for bond i during day t as:
BASi,t =
1
Ki,t
Ki,t∑
k=1
(PAi,t,k − PBi,t,k
PMi,t,k
)
. (2)
We aggregate the bond-level bid-ask spread to the country and sample level to get market-
wide transaction cost estimates. In aggregating to the country or sample level we use volume
weighting to reflect transaction costs of traded volume as opposed to transaction costs of
tradeable bonds (giving higher weight to quotes of bonds that are frequently traded). The
weight w of bond i is given by:
wi,t =
∑25
m=6 V OLi,t−m∑
i=1
∑25
m=6 V OLi,t−m
, (3)
where the volume weighting of bond i depends on trading volume over days from t = −25
to t = −6. We calculate bid-ask spreads as the weighted sum of the individual bid-ask
spreads for a country or our entire sample on a daily level.
Table 2 Panel B displays descriptive statistics for the volume weighted bid-ask spreads
time series on country and sample level. The first three rows show the averages for the whole
sample period as well as two sub periods which correspond to the crisis and non-crisis period
(The crisis period starts, as in Nyborg and Östberg (2014), August 9, 2007 and lasts until
the end of the sample period). The figures show that the European sovereign bond market
is extremely liquid in the pre-crisis period. The average volume weighted bid-ask spread
in the sample is 0.025%. In the pre-crisis period Italy is the most liquid country with
an average bid-ask spread of 0.020%. This is consistent with the description of European
sovereign bond markets as very liquid in the pre-crisis period (e.g. Cheung, De Jong and
Rindi, 2005 and Pagano and von Thadden, 2004).
However during the crisis the bid-ask spreads increase dramatically. The average volume
weighted bid-ask spreads in the crisis period is 7.7 times larger (increase from 0.025% to
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0.194%) than in the pre-crisis period. Bid-ask spreads increase less in the CORE countries
(E.g. in Germany the bid-ask spreads increase from 0.34% to 0.140%) than in the GIIPS
countries (e.g. in Greece the bid-ask spreads increase 0.054% to 4.708%). Additionally,
one should note that the average level in GIIPS countries also reaches very high values in
absolute terms (the cross-country average bid-ask spread is 1.585%). The other figures in
the Panel B show descriptive statistics for the whole sample period. The median values show
the same patterns as described for the means. The standard deviations are high indicating
a lot of time variation in bid-ask spreads. Maximum bid-ask spreads in Ireland, Greece and
Portugal even cross the 10% level, reflecting the severity of the crisis. Overall the statistics
in Panel B indicate that trading costs increased significantly during the crisis.
3.3 Yields
The extant literature identifies flight episodes through yield spreads.22 In particular we
use a threshold model similar to Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht and Wei (2013) to identify
flights. Since the composition of our sample (in terms of maturity and duration) varies over
time and countries we base our flight measure on the yield of a synthetic 10 year constant
maturity bond. This yield is backed out from a Nelson and Siegel (1987) yield curve that we
estimate for each country and day of our sample. We selected this model since it represents
a good trade-off between model complexity and tractability (Beber et al., 2009 use it for a
MTS sample of sovereign bonds). The estimation procedure is explained in more detail in
Appendix A.
Our goal is to measure changes in relative safety of sovereigns. Both academics and
the financial press view German bunds as a safe haven and as a result it is natural to
consider the spread of a sovereign over the German yield (Geyer, Kossmeier, and Pichler
(2004) and Favero, Pagano and von Thadden (2010) consider the spread over the German
yields as well). For all of our countries (except Germany) the daily (t) yield spread Y LSt
is calculated as:
Y LSt =
Yt − Y DEt
Y DEt
, (4)
22Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009) show that the yields spread between the sovereign par yield and
the euro swap yield reflects flight-to-liquidity (using cross-country liquidity differences) and flight-to-quality
(using cross-country differences in CDS premia). Similarly, Longstaff (2004) uses the yield spread between
US Treasuries and Refcorp bonds to identify flights-to-liquidity. Garcia and Gimeno (2014) calculate a
flight-to-safety and flight-to-liquidity factor based on agency spreads (e.g. the KfW-Bund spread).
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where Yt and Y DEt are the 10-year constant maturity yields of the sovereign and Germany
(DE), respectively. In addition to the country-specific yield spreads a sample aggregate
is required for our analysis. Thus we calculate volume weights on a country basis in a
similar way as in Section 3.2 (effectively replacing the bond index in Eq. (3) with a country
equivalent). We use these weights to calculate a daily sample yield spread. This yield spread
can approximately be interpreted as the the difference in sovereign risk (vis-a-vis Germany)
of the average traded Euro in the sample.
Panel C of Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the time series of these yield spreads
(relative to the German yield). The statistics for median and average confirm that all the
countries in the sample have to pay higher yields to borrow for 10 years than Germany. As
expected the yield spreads in the GIIPS countries are far above the German yield (they
average between 63.87% (Spain) and 194.51% (Greece)). Also in line with expectations the
yields of highly rated CORE countries such as Finland (6.72%) or the Netherlands (6.88%)
are only slightly above the German yield. This substantiates our choice of Germany as the
benchmark country.23
From Figure 5 it is evident that yield spreads are highly time varying. The sample
yield spread is very low (close to zero) in the beginning of the sample period. However
yields start to diverge when the financial crisis starts and then soar during the European
sovereign debt crisis often connected to events such as bailouts and bank collapses. Yield
spreads start to converge again for a short period after Mario Draghis "whatever it takes"-
speech (See also Figure 1). The sovereign debt crisis is characterized by severe changes in
yields spreads and thus relative safety of the individual countries.
4 Results
4.1 Event Study
As outlined in the introduction the academic literature suggests that the flight-to-safety
phenomenon leads to large-scale rebalancing in times of market stress. Consequently trading
in the sovereign bond markets should be characterized by high trading activity when markets
are stressed. In order to investigate this claim we undertake an event study in the spirit of
23In the beginning of the sample period the yields of all countries are very similar. In this period the
German yield is occasionally above those of the other countries, which leads to the negative yield spreads
displayed in the minimum statistics.
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Kandel and Pearson (1995) to identify abnormal volume surrounding market stress events.
We identify market stress days using a threshold model in the spirit of Baele et al. (2013)
that identifies days with an increase in the yield of one of our sample countries and a
decrease in the German yield. The model is:
FTSt = I{∆Yj,t > zj,t} × I{∆Y DEt < zDEt }, (5)
where I is an indicator function and ∆Yj,t and ∆Y DEt are the changes in the 10-year constant
maturity yield of the country j and Germany, respectively. For each day t and risky country
j (i.e., all except Germany) a day is classified as a flight event if the increase in the yield is
greater than the threshold zj,t and the decrease in the German yield (the safe country) is
lower than the threshold zDEt . The thresholds zj,t and zDEt are:
zj,t = κ× σj,t and zDEt = κDE × σDEt . (6)
The σj,t is the country-specific, time-varying volatility of the yield changes (calculated based
on the previous 100 days) and κ is the threshold parameter. For the risky countries we apply
three different values of κ which are 1.0, 1.5 and 2.0 while the κDE is fixed at -0.75.24
[Insert Table 3 here]
The number of events per country and event type are tabulated in Table 3, Panel A. 245
days were classified as event days using the threshold model with κ = 1.0. If κ is increased
to 1.5 or 2.0 the number of observed events decreases to 138 and 84, respectively. Not
surprisingly most of the events occur in GIIPS countries since the yields of these countries
and the German yield are more likely to diverge given the development of country-specific
credit risks (See e.g. the evolution of the ratings in Table 1, Panel C).
We examine the volume ratio RV OL as defined in Eq. (1) around these events. As
discussed in section 3.1 this measure can be directly interpreted as abnormal volume since
it compares the volume on the current day to the volume in the previous five days. We
24We choose the values for κ in the risky countries in line with the previous literature. Baele et al.
(2013) choose a κ of 1.5 and Engle et al. (2012), select κ’s of 1.0, 1.5 and 2.0. Since these papers study
flights from equity to bond markets and we study flights within the sovereign bond market we do not use a
symmetric κ. There are several reasons for this: (1) An equal amount of rebalancing from the risky to the
safe country is likely to have a larger impact on the yield of risky countries because on average these markets
are considerably smaller (debt outstanding). (2) Yield changes in the risky country most likely reflect both
rebalancing effects and information revelation whereas the yield changes in Germany are likely to include
mostly rebalancing effects.
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consider a window of 8 days around an event (in event time τ from τ = −2 to τ = +5). To
ensure that we benchmark the volume at a particular day with volume that is not influenced
by the event itself we compare the volume in this period with the volume in the five days
from τ = −6 to τ = −10.25
Table 3, Panel B shows descriptive statistics for the event windows around our flight
events. In all three cases for the threshold model both the mean and the median of the
volume ratio are negative indicating that volume is depressed surrounding the flight events.
The more severe the market stress (higher the threshold κ), the higher is the reduction in
volume. Similarly one can see that the bid-ask spreads (mean) are increasing in the degree
of market stress. By construction we observe a similar pattern for yield spreads.
We assess the significance of the volume ratio RV OL at a particular day τ in the event-
window using standard errors that are calculated using the ordinary cross-sectional method
(See Boehmer et al., 1991).26 It is defined as the standard deviation of the volume ratio
of all events on event-day τ . Applying the described cross-sectional approach means that
we use only observations from the event window and only one observation per event which
results in standard errors that are not biased by autocorrelation (there is no time dimension)
and event-induced variance (only data from events used).27
In Panel A of Table 4 we present the average values of the volume ratio RV OL from day
τ = −2 to τ = 5 (columns) and the different types of events (rows). The first row contains
results using the threshold model with a κ of 2.0. From day τ = 1 to τ = 5 point estimates
are negative and economically large. At τ = 1 the volume ratio is -33.6 and statistically
significant at the 5%-level. This implies that one day after the event volume is 33.6% lower
than it was on average over days τ = −10 to τ = −6. As we progress in event time the
volume ratio seems to decrease. At (τ = 5) the volume ratio is -36.9% and significant at the
25If this period contains data that is associated with another event we consider the closest previous period
that does not contain any other event.
26Formally, the standard error σcrossτ is defined for each event-day τ as:
σcrossτ =
√√√√ 1
N(N − 1)
N∑
e=1
(
RV OLn,τ −
N∑
n=1
RV OLn,τ
N
)2
, (7)
where n is a single event, N is the number of all events and RV OLn,τ is the volume ratio at event n at
event-day τ .
27We have also calculated standard errors with the traditional portfolio approach (based on the time
series variation of our variables in an estimation window) which has resulted in slightly lower standard
errors suggesting that we have event induced variance and / or autocorrelation. The advantage of the
portfolio approach is that it deals with cross-event correlation, but there is little clustering of events in our
sample.
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1%-level. Prior to the event (event days τ = −1 and τ = −2) volume is not significantly
different from zero suggesting our threshold measure identifies large shocks fairly well.
It is striking that when the shocks that we consider become smaller (i.e., the κ is reduced
and we consider more events) the reduction in volume becomes less pronounced or even turns
into an increase. When κ is reduced to 1.5 the freeze occurs later and is less severe. We only
observe a significant drop in volume from day τ = 2 on. For κ = 1.0 we even have a positive
volume ratio of 4.3% at the event day (τ = 0). However after that volume turns negative
again but the extent of the decrease is less pronounced. The volume ratio on day τ = 4
is 16.6% lower for a κ of one than for a κ of two. The average difference across days from
τ = 1 to τ = 5 is 12.9%. The evidence in this panel shows that our events are associated
with market freezes and more severe events are associated with significantly lower volume.
To evaluate whether the volume response to the shock is conditional on transaction costs
we classify all of our events (within a country) into two groups depending on whether they
are associated with above or below median bid-ask spreads. In order to have a significant
amount of events we use the events classified with a κ of 1.0.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The high bid-ask spread events are associated with significant market freezes. At the
event day the volume ratio is -14.7% and insignificant. Given that the shock to yield spreads
can occur at any point during the day it is quite likely that the volume reaction will only be
fully incorporated a day later. Consistent with this we find that on day τ = 1 the volume
ratio is -42.2% with an associated t-statistic of -3.54. The volume ratio is statistically
significant below zero in the following days (τ = 1 to τ = 5). The magnitude of the freeze
is remarkable since the decrease in volume is between -37.4% and -55.3%.
For low bid-ask spread events we observe the opposite, volume increases suggesting that
investors rebalance. At the event day (τ = 0) the volume ratio is 22.9% and statistically
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that in the absence of large increases in transaction
costs investors choose to rebalance. This is consistent with evidence of flights in sovereign
bond markets during the pre-crisis period (Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz, 2009) and in equity
markets (Ben-Raphael, 2014). Following the event day we observe neither the market
freezing nor rebalancing. This suggests that rebalancing occurs fairly immediately and is
not persistent (unlike the freezes).
16
The third row of Panel B shows the differences in volume ratios between the two groups
of events and the associated t-statistics (based on a two-sample t-test). In the six days
from the event date τ = 0 to τ = 5 the differences are negative as well as economically
and statistically significant. They range between 26.8% and 59.3%. The differences are not
as large before the event day. This suggests that the differences are not only driven by
the differences in the two groups but also by a differential impact of the event itself across
groups.
Now we examine whether the decrease in the volume ratio is driven by (abnormal)
increases of the bid-ask spreads. Abnormal values of the bid-ask spread are calculated as
the bid-ask spread on a particular day in the event window less the average bid-ask spread
from τ = −10 to τ = −6. The bid-ask spreads increase substantially around our events,
both when the bid-ask spreads are at a high level and when they are at a low level. For
both high and low bid-ask spreads the increase in bid-ask spreads precedes the decrease in
volume. The absolute increases in bid-ask spreads are greater for the high bid-ask spread
group suggesting that the larger decrease in volume is due to the more pronounced responses
in the bid-ask spreads.28
[Insert Figure 6 here]
In Figure 6, we present the evolution (over our event window) of our main quantities of
interest: relative volume, bid-ask spreads and yield spreads. Essentially the figure graphi-
cally presents the results of Table 4 while providing a benchmark based on placebo events.
The red line represents the point estimates and the grey shaded area is the 95% confidence
interval around them. In the leftmost graphs we plot relative volume. In the overall sam-
ple, displayed in the top panel there is an insignificant increase in volume on the event day.
The middle and bottom panels display the results for high and low bid-ask spread events
separately. From this it is evident that the insignificant increase in the top graph is due to
low bid-ask spread events which experience an immediate increase in volume. Examining
the bottom volume ratio graph (low bid-ask spreads) it is apparent that rebalancing only
28In order to ensure that our results are not driven by Greece (for which we have occasionally sparse data)
we estimated Table 4 without Greece. Additionally, to make sure that our results are not driven by trends
in volume we use alternative benchmark models. Instead of using RV OL we calculate the abnormal volume
as the difference between RV OL at a particular day in the event window minus the average RVOL from
τ = −10 to τ = −6 (from τ = −205 to τ = −6) to control for short term (long term) trends. None of these
deviations changes our qualitative results (available upon request).
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occurs on the event day and after this day volume is not higher than it was during our
benchmark period. In contrast for high bid-ask spread events volume falls on the event day
and remains low throughout our event period (i.e. the freeze is persistent).
The middle graphs display the changes in bid-ask spreads during our events. In the top
graph we examine bid-ask spreads around the pooled sample of events. The bid-ask spreads
are elevated throughout the event period. The elevated levels prior to the event day are
suggestive of bid-ask spreads eliciting the observed volume responses. Bid-ask spreads seem
to exhibit a sharp increase from day τ = −1 to τ = 1 followed by an incomplete reversal
that leaves bid-ask spreads at a persistent higher level than during our benchmark period.
The difference in bid-ask spreads between the middle (high spread events) and bottom (low
spread events) graphs are striking. On the event day, the mean abnormal bid-ask spread is
1% for the high bid-ask spread events whereas the corresponding number for low bid-ask
spread events is 0.1%. This large difference explains the asymmetric volume response across
groups.
In order to exclude that our results are generated by an incomplete benchmark model
or mechanical relations in the data we perform a placebo test. We draw 15 random events
per country and resample them 200 times. We calculate the mean abnormal values of our
quantities of interest in the same way as our actual abnormal quantities. In each graph the
blue lines represent the mean of the placebo quantities and it is reassuring that they are
always very close to zero.
[Insert Table 5 here]
In Table 5 the events are split according to whether they occur in a CORE or in a GIIPS
country. The table shows that the GIIPS countries are more likely to experience decreases in
volume (statistically and economically significant for days τ = 1 to τ = 5) while for CORE
countries the effect of stress seems to lead to rebalancing. At the event day we observe a
positive volume ratio of more than 27.7%. The difference in the volume ratios between the
CORE and the GIIPS countries is always negative confirming that volume decreases are
more severe and common in the GIIPS countries. The evidence in Table 5 corroborates our
previous finding that increasing transactions costs lead to market freezes. First, the bid-ask
spreads increase significantly more for GIIPS which are the countries that also experience
a market freeze. Second, increases in the bid-ask spread occur prior to decreases in volume.
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4.2 Cross-Sectional Regressions
The results in the previous section have shown that freezes are prevalent in the sovereign
bond market, but occasionally when events are not associated with elevated transaction
costs there is rebalancing. In this section we want to establish that there are two opposing
effects of market stress on trading volume. First, given that agents are heterogeneous and
markets are incomplete price changes (changes in the yield spread) should lead to agents
trading to reach their new optimal portfolio. Second, market stress is also associated with
increased transaction costs and therefore less trading. Thus, the net effect on volume is
ambiguous. In this section we use as sample days from τ = −2 to day τ = 5 around our
flight events. Using the entire window has the advantage that it provides us with both
cross-sectional variation (across events) and time-series variation (days within the event
window). The time-series variation is necessary since by definition our flight events do not
exhibit much cross-sectional variation in yield spreads. We pool all events and all days in
the event window and estimate the following regression:
RV OL = αj + βBAS + γY LS +
K∑
k=1
δkControl + u, (8)
where RV OL, BAS and Y LS are the relative volume, bid-ask spread and yield spread
in the country where the event takes place on that particular day in the event window,
respectively. Control is a set of control variables. Standard errors are clustered by event to
account for cross-correlation of errors within an event.
[Insert Table 6 here]
In column (1) of Table 6 we consider the events given by the threshold model with a κ
of one. As expected, we find that the point estimate on the bid-ask spread is negative while
the estimate on the yield spread is positive. Both of the estimates are significant at the
1% level. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the yield
spread is associated with an increase in relative trading volume of 0.24 which corresponds
to a 69.0% increase relative to the unconditional mean (the unconditional mean of the
relative volume is -0.141). A one standard deviation increase in the bid-ask spread leads
to a decrease in the relative volume of 0.27 (or 92.5% relative to the unconditional mean).
Columns (2) and (3) are identical to column (1) except that they use a κ of 1.5 and 2,
respectively. Statistical significance and economic magnitudes are very similar.
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In columns (4)-(6) we introduce control variables. We include day of the week and month
of the year dummies, indicator variables for macroeconomic news as well as monetary policy
announcements and country fixed effects (αj). The inclusion of control variables does not
change the point estimates significantly.
In Panel B we consider first differences of all of our variables to ensure that our results
are not driven by serial correlation. We find negative and significant point estimates for the
bid-ask spread in five out of six specifications. Surprisingly, we find insignificant results for
the yield spread in five out of six specifications. However, it is reassuring that the point
estimates are positive in all specifications.
Overall the statistical significance of the results as well as the estimated economic mag-
nitudes show, consistent with the event study results that the transaction costs channel is
more important suggesting that freezes are a likely outcome in sovereign bond markets in
times of market stress.
4.3 Bond level Evidence and Difference-in-Difference
To confirm that it is reduced risk-bearing capacity that results in the drop in aggregate
volume we exploit variation in the effect of the shock on risk-bearing capacity of market
makers. MTS has two platforms, one domestic (with predominantly local market makers)
and one international (European Bond Market) where large international financial insti-
tutions act as market makers. Table 7 provides an overview of the nationality of market
makers in each market.29 The share of domestic market makers is high e.g. in the Italian
market 24.8% of the market makers are Italian banks while in the other markets under study
only 4.7% of the market makers are Italian. Given that domestic banks hold a significant
amount of domestic sovereign bonds we expect the domestic market to be more affected
by our flight events.30 Thus, volume and bid-ask spreads should be more affected in the
domestic market where the market making ability is more exposed to the flight event.
[Insert Table 7 here]
29Unfortunately MTS does not provide a participant list for the EBM. However anecdotal evidence suggests
that market making is facilitated by a more international group of market makers on the EBM.
30Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) document that European domestic banks hold on average 22.4% of the
outstanding sovereign debt. Potential reasons for these large exposures of banks to domestic sovereign bonds
could be home bias (French and Poterba, 1991) and moral suasion (Ongena et al., 2016).
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In this section we consider volume and bid-ask spreads on the bond level. Apart from
providing more power this has two additional advantages. First, since we compare volume
and bid-ask spreads for a particular bond across platforms we can exclude that bond char-
acteristics are driving our results. Second, it is quite likely that the bonds that are traded
on the two platforms differ (selection), by considering the same bond across the domestic
and international platform we can alleviate selection concerns.
We use a difference-in-difference regression framework to quantify the different response
of volume and bid-ask spreads to stress on the two platforms. We compare the domestic and
the EBM market before and after our stress events and predict that the domestic market
experiences larger increases in bid-ask spreads and larger decreases in trading activity. We
consider 21 days around our events (from τ = -10 to +10), where the sample events (denoted
by e) are defined by our threshold model with varying κ’s. We only consider events for which
we observe quotes on both the international and the domestic MTS platform (we lose some
events due to this restriction).31 Additionally we require active trading for at least three
dates per platform to include the platform volume for a particular event. We estimate the
following regressions:
V OLb,p,t = αb,e + ατ + β DOMp + γDOMp × postτ +
K∑
k=1
δkControlb,p,t + ub,p,t, (9)
BASb,p,t = αb,e + ατ + β DOMp + γDOMp × postτ +
K∑
k=1
δkControlb,p,t + ub,p,t, (10)
where V OLb,p,t is the sum of the Euro trading volume for bond b on platform p on day t
(the day t corresponds to an event e and an event day τ). BASb,p,t is the average daily
relative bid-ask spread aggregated accross all quotes for a bond b on platform p at day t.
DOMp is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for volume (bid-ask spreads)
traded (quoted) on the domestic platform and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable postτ
takes the value of 0 before the event and 1 on the event day and afterwards. A statistically
significant γ on the interaction term, DOMp × postτ , indicates that our events have an
asymmetric impact across our platforms. We expect γ to be negative when we consider
volume, indicating that volume falls more in the domestic market than in the international
market and vice versa for bid-ask-spreads.
31The number of events drops from 245 (κ = 1.0), 138 (κ = 1.5), 84 (κ = 2.0) to 240, 135 and 83,
respectively.
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The intercept αb,e is a bond×event fixed effect. This implies that we are effectively
using within-bond-event variation. This ensures that our results cannot be driven by bond
characteristics that are invariant within the event (e.g., 21 days). Also, this excludes our
results being driven by any market and macro conditions which are constant throughout
the event. Additionally, we introduce 21 event-day dummies ατ (one for each event-day τ
from -10 to 10) to ensure that our results are not driven by mechanical trading patterns
around events. In addition we add the same set of control variables as in the cross-sectional
regressions (see the caption to Table 6) plus the minimum-price tick to control for other
differences in market structure across the platforms. Standard errors are clustered at the
event level.
[Insert Table 8 here]
The results with volume as the dependent variable is presented in Panel A of Table 8.
The coefficient γ of the interaction term DOM × post is always negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level. This shows that trading volume decreases disproportionately
in the domestic market. This is consistent with a larger decrease of risk bearing capacity
of domestic market makers. Based on specification (6) this corresponds to an additional
decrease of Euro 4.39 million (or 20.2% relative to the unconditional mean) on the domestic
platform. The coefficient on post is negative and statistically signifcant at the 1% level. This
is consistent with volume falling on both platforms in response to stress. The coefficient on
DOM is always postive and statistically significant showing that the trading volume is on
average higher in the domestic market.
The results for the bid-ask spread are in Panel B of Table 8. Here the coefficient
γ of the interaction term DOM × post is always positive and statistically significant at
the 1% or 5% level. This shows that spreads increase more on the domestic platform
than on the EBM. Based on specification (5) this corresponds to an additional increase
in bid-ask spreads of 0.0008 (or 6.2% relative to the unconditional mean) on the domestic
platform. Even though the economic magnitudes are small in absolute terms, given that
this is a competitive market it is significant that the change in average spread of the same
bond differs across platforms. The coefficient on the variable post indicates that bid-ask
spreads rise signifcantly in response to stress events and that the increase is monontonically
increasing with the degree of market stress (increasing κ).
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[Insert Figure 7 here]
Panel A of Figure 7 graphs the average trading volume on the domestic and the EBM
platform from 10 days prior to the event to 10 days after the event. After the event volume
decreases on both platforms, but significantly more on the domestic platform. Similar to
the difference-in-difference analysis we find that prior to the event trading volume is greater
on the domestic platform. Prior to the event day volume is more or less constant on both
platforms suggesting that we do not have diverging trends prior to the event. We also
display the trading volume of our placebo events (randomly generated). It is reassuring
that the placebo events do not seem to be associated with abnormal volume.
This section has shown that the reduction in trading volume primarily occurs in the
domestic market and that domestic spreads increase disproportionately. For domestic mar-
ket makers our events represent a larger decrease in their risk bearing capacity due to the
overweighting of domestic sovereign bonds in their balance sheet. Thus, this section is
consistent the existence of a link between market maker wealth and liquidity provision (Ho
and Stoll, 1981). Essentially, this section documents that when the exposure to the shock
is large and market makers are homogenous the freeze is more palpable.
4.4 Time Series Regressions
In this section we use the fact that certain shocks have a larger impact on investor rebalanc-
ing while others are more likely to affect the liquidity provision of market makers and thus
have different implications for volume. For example, an increase in Bank CDS spreads is
likely to affect the funding costs of the market maker and therefore liquidity provision and
ultimately results in a decrease in volume. On the other hand, we hypothesize that equity
market shocks primarily affect volume through investor wealth effects (generating investor
rebalancing).
In Eqs. (11)-(13) we estimate a simultaneous equation system, based on aggregate time
series data, where volume is determined by the yield spread and the bid-ask spread. These
two variables in turn are a function of shocks (described below). This implies that we
can trace the impact of those shocks on volume through their impact on yield and bid-ask
spreads. The equation system we estimate is:
V OLt =α1 + ρ1V OLt−1 + βY LSt + γBASt +
K∑
k=1
δ1kControlk,t + u1t, (11)
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BASt =α2 + ρ2BASt−1 +
N∑
n=1
φnShockk,t +
K∑
k=1
δ2kControlk,t + u2t, (12)
Y LSt =α3 + ρ3Y LSt−1 +
N∑
n=1
pinShockk,t +
K∑
k=1
δ3kControlk,t + u3t, (13)
where V OLt, BASt and Y LSt are the sample volume, the volume weighted bid-ask spread
and the volume weighted yield spread. The shocks that we hypothesize will affect volume
trough investor rebalancing (as a consequence of wealth effects) are: VSTOXX (implied
volatility of EuroStoxx50), equity returns (returns of EuroStoxx50) and foreign exchange
movements (Euro-to-US Dollar exchange rate).32 We hypothesize that the following shocks
primarily affects volume through the transaction cost channel: Bank CDS spreads (CMA
Bank Sector Credit Default Swap Index) and the Libor-OIS spread (funding frictions imply
that market makers are unable to fund inventory, Nyborg and Östberg, 2014).
Additionally, we control for macroeconomic announcements, changes of the main refi-
nancing rate, day of the week, month of the year and a time trend. The system is estimated
using the General Method of Moments (GMM) in order to take the pre-estimation of the
yield and bid-ask spreads as well as cross-equation correlations into account. Standard
errors are calculated using the method of Newey and West (1984) with seven lags.33
[Insert Table 9 here]
Table 9 displays the descriptive statistics of the shock variables and the sample volume.
In this section since we consider the entire sample we do not need to benchmark volume to
facilitate cross-country comparison. On the average day sovereign bonds worth EUR 7.38
billion are traded on MTS. The traded amount is substantially lower in the crisis period
(see Figure 1). Additionally, the table shows descriptive statistics for the Libor-OIS spread,
the Euro-to-US Dollar exchange rate, Bank CDS spreads, the EuroStoxx 50 returns and
the VSTOXX.
32In Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009) price changes (volatility) lead to passive changes in investor
portfolios that are offset with active rebalancing. In addition to that Kyle and Xiong (2001) argue that
a shock in one market (here equity or foreign exchange market) can lead to a trade in another market
because investors liquidate positions in both markets when they face losses. Additionally, foreign currency
appreciations are hypothesized to trigger a reallocation of funds of foreign investors if FX risk-trading is
imperfect (Hau and Rey, 2004).
33In unreported analysis we estimated the system in Eqs. (11)-(13) using equation-by-equation OLS and
the results were qualitatively the same. The results are available upon request. The number of lags used
to calculate Newey-West standard errors is determined by the fourth root of the number of observations, as
suggested by Greene (2012, p. 960).
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Table 10 presents the results of esimating the system described by Eqs. (11)-(13). The
shock variables, VSTOXX, Libor-OIS and the bank CDS spreads are all correlated and
therefore we start by estimating the system with only one of the variables included at a
time (equation systems (1)-(3) in Table 10). Additionally, in system (4) we include all
variables simultaneously. Reassuringly, the results are qualitatively similar and therefore
we base the following discussion on system (4).
[Insert Table 10 here]
We find that the bid-ask spread is negatively related to volume (throughout all estimated
equation systems). The point estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms
of economic magnitude, a one standard increase in the bid-ask spread reduces volume by
EUR 898.67 million which represents a drop of 12.2% relative to the unconditional mean
(EUR 7,383.1 million). Moreover we find that the yield spread is positively related to volume
(statistically significant at the 1% level in all the estimated equation systems). An increase
of the yield spread by one standard deviation leads to an increase in volume of EUR 161.16
million (2.18% relative to the unconditional mean). Even though economically significant
the economic impact of the yield spreads on volume is much lower than the impact of the
bid-ask spreads (consistent with our previous results). This suggests that the liquidity and
the rebalancing channel both exist, but that the transaction costs channel is the dominant
one.
We explore the determinants of the bid-ask spread by estimating Eq. (12). Bank
CDS spreads and the Libor-OIS spread have a positive impact on bid-ask spreads and are
statistically significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with the idea that reduced risk-
taking capacity of market makers or higher costs to finance inventories result in higher
bid-ask spreads (Ho and Stoll, 1981). As expected the VSTOXX has a positive effect while
equity returns are negatively related to bid-ask spreads, however, both are not statistically
significant.
In Eq. (13) we examine the determinants of the yield spread. We find that yield spreads
are negatively related (statistically significant at the 1% level) to equity returns suggesting
that losses in the equity market (associated with wealth effects) lead to a desire of holding
safe assets (German bonds as opposed to more risky sovereign bonds of for example Italy
or Spain). The Euro-to-US Dollar exchange rate is positively and significantly related to
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yields spreads as well. A weak euro is often associated with concerns about the soundness
of the fiscal situation of euro-area economies and has wealth effects (Hau and Rey, 2008).
Having estimated system Eqs. (11)-(13) we can trace shocks through the system. A
shock in bank CDS spreads will effect volume trough both the bid-ask spread and the yield
spread. A one standard deviation increase in bank CDS spreads increases bid-ask spreads
by 19.44% and yield spreads by 1.0% (relative to the unconditional mean). The net effect
on volume of these two effects is estimated to be a EUR 135.19 million decrease in volume
(-1.8% relative to the unconditional mean). A shock to the Libor-OIS spread only has a
significant effect on volume trough the bid-ask spread. A one standard deviation increase
leads to an increase in the bid-ask spread by 11.37% relative to the unconditional mean.
This increase in the bid-ask spread feeds into a decrease of volume by EUR 77.7 million
(-1.1% relative to the unconditional mean).
A decrease in equity returns leaves bid-ask spreads unchanged (no significant relation)
but leads to a statistically significant increase of the yield spread of 2.8% (compared to
the unconditional mean). Through the yield spread volume increases by EUR 3.77 million
which corresponds to 0.1% increase compared to the unconditional mean. This suggests
that the yield spread channel is rather weak but can be dominant if the origin of market
stress is mainly associated with wealth effects.
[Insert Table 11 here]
In Table 11 we estimate Eq. (11) using first differences of the bid-ask spread and the
yield spread as well as the relative volume ratio RV OL. In specification (1) we do not
add any control variables. Going from specification (1) to (5) we add control variables (the
same as in the level regressions) one by one until we have included the full set. In all the
specifications the results show that RV OL is decreasing in bid-ask spreads and increasing
in yield spreads (associated coefficients are always statistically significant). These results
thus support the conclusions from the level regressions.
5 Conclusion
The European sovereign bond market is central to the operation of the European financial
system. Not only is the functioning of this secondary market essential for countries that
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need to borrow, but also affects monetary transmission in the Euro area since sovereign debt
is often used as collateral in refinancing operations (both the main refinancing operations
and the longer-term refinancing operation of the European Central Bank) and other repo
transactions. Given that liquidity providers (large banks) have significant exposure to our
stress events the recent European sovereign debt crisis provides an ideal setting to study the
impact of reductions in risk bearing capacity and the follow on effects on liquidity (bid-ask
spreads) and ultimately trading.
In this paper we use trade-by-trade data from the MTS platform from April 2003 to
December 2014. The comprehensiveness of the data allows us to characterize trading ac-
tivity of participants in this market. In particular, we find that in, times of stress, trading
is occasionally almost halted. The response of the market to stress is highly conditional
on the willingness / capacity of market makers to provide liquidity. Additionally, we show
that more exposed market makers quote higher spreads which depresses trading activity.
Moreover our results suggest that a shock that results in an increase in market maker CDS
spreads will reduce their risk bearing capacity and as a result market makers protect them-
selves by widening bid-ask spreads. Consistent with this, we find that shocks that are not
associated with an increase in bid-ask spreads are associated with rebalancing (elevated
volume). However, if the shock is also associated with an increase in bid-ask spreads, then
it is often the case that the increase in trading costs outweigh the rebalancing motive and
the market appears to freeze.
Given the central nature of this market, freezes may contribute to system wide insta-
bility. Our research suggests that the functioning of the European sovereign bond markets
depends on a small number of dealer banks whose balance sheets are not able to facilitate
intermediation services in times of stress. In other markets alternative market makers such
as high frequency traders step in (Carrion, 2013, notes that HF traders provide liquidity in
the equity market when other providers are unable). Potentially, regulators should thus aim
at making this market more resilient by facilitating more market makers and disentangling
the market maker balance sheets from sovereign risk. Extrapolating, the reduction in liq-
uidity provision is potentially a negative side effect of moral suasion (Ongena et al., 2016).
Overall, this paper challenges the view that the recent sovereign debt crisis was associated
with large scale rebalancing.
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Appendix: Constant Maturity Yields
The Nelson and Siegel (1987) model expresses the yield Y as a function of the maturity m
and four parameters as follows:
Yt(m) = β0,t + β1,t
1− exp(−mτt )
m
τt
+ β2,t
[
1− exp(−mτt )
m
τt
+ exp
(
− m
τt
)]
, (14)
where β0 can be interpreted as the long-term interest rate and β0 + β1 as the short term
interest rate (as m tends to zero the yield tends to β0 + β1). The β2 parameter defines
the magnitude and the shape of the hump or the U-shape of the estimated curve. The
τ -parameter determines exponential decay.
First, we determine theoretical prices based on the yield curve. This involves defining
discount rates for each cash flow for all our bonds. Each discount rate depends on the
maturity of the cash flow and is calculated from Eq. (14). The theoretical price of the bond
is the sum of all the discounted cash flows. Second, we choose the parameters β0, β1, β2
and τ such that the weighted squared difference between observed and theoretical prices
is minimized. We calculate weights based on the duration of the bonds as proposed by
Bliss (1997).34 The problem is solved using the Newton-Raphson algorithm. To reduce the
dependence of the solution on the starting values we apply a grid search for globally optimal
starting parameters using a methodology developed by Werner and Ferenzi (2006).35
Practically, we use information from the reference files to construct the series of cash-
flows for each bond. The cash-flow dates are determined by the first coupon date, the
maturity date and the coupon frequency. The size of the cash flow is defined by the coupon
rate and the principal payment at maturity. The convention on MTS is that prices are
quoted without accrued interest (referred to as clean price), implying that the price actually
paid is the sum of the clean price and the accrued interest (dirty price). To match the dirty
theoretical price we add the accrued interest to the quoted clean price.
For Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain our yield curve opti-
mization converges for all of our sample days. In other countries we fail to achieve con-
vergence in rare occasions (with the exception of Greece, Portugal (99.86%) and Ireland
34The weighting is introduced since longer duration bonds are more price sensitive and therefore lead to
heteroskedasticity.
35Ferstel and Hayden (2010) provides a good description of the implementation of Nelson and Siegel yield
curve estimation using the weights proposed by Bliss (1997) and the grid search algorithm of Werner and
Ferenzi (2006) in R. We implemented the corresponding optimization in mata. Further details of the yield
curve estimations are summarized in Appendix A.
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(99.15%) have the lowest rate of convergence). In these cases of non-convergence we in-
terpolate the 10 year yield using the value from day t = −1 and day t = +1. In total
this results in 31 replacements which corresponds to 0.01% of the country bond-days. In
Greece we observe a widening of quotes during the height of the sovereign debt crisis mak-
ing the mid price unreliable for a large cross-section of bonds and ultimately resulting in
non-convergence. Thus, after April 14, 2011 we use the yields of the bond that is closest to
have 10 years to maturity.
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Figure 2: Total volume SENAF and MDPA
Panel A displays the monthly trading volume (in Euro millions) as reported by SENAF (Sistema Electrónico
de Negociación de Activos Financieros) a domestic electronic trading platform for Spanish sovereign debt
between January, 2008 and July, 2008. Panel B plots daily trading volume (in Euro millions) from the
Mercado de Deuda Pública Anotada (as reported by primary dealers to the Bank of Spain) over the period
February, 12, 2008 to March, 20, 2008. The vertical dotted line is on March 6, 2008.
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Figure 3: Sample volume, bid-ask spreads and yield spreads around March 6,
2008
This figure displays the time series of five-day moving averages (MA5) of the Euro volume, the volume
weighted bid-ask spreads and the yield spread over the first quarter of 2008. The euro volume is calculated
from notional amounts and trade prices for all trades that occur on MTS. The volume of all trades at a
particular day is then summed across all bonds in the sample (excluding Germany) to arrive at the sample
volume. The daily bid-ask spread is calculated as an equally weighted average across all the quotes (for a
particular bond). Next the daily sample bid-ask spread is calculated as volume weighted average (based on
the last 20 trading days) across all bonds. The yield spread is calculated as the difference between 10-year
constant maturity yields of Germany and the respective country divided by the German yield and then
aggregated to the sample level using volume weighting (based on the last 20 trading days). The 10-year
constant maturity yields are estimated from the cross-section of bonds in a country using the Nelson and
Siegel (1987) method.
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Figure 4: Volume by Market Segments in the French Market
This figure displays time series of monthly trading volume in the French sovereign bond market. The blue
line labeled Interdealer is the total trading volume (in EUR) when both parties of a trade are dealers. The
red line labeled Clients is the total trading volume (denominated in EUR) when one party is a client and the
other is a dealer. The Interdealer and the Clients data is supplied by the French treasury agency (Agence
France Trésor). The grey line labeled MTS is the overall volume traded in the French segment of the MTS
platform.
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Figure 5: Time series of daily volume, relative volume, bid-ask spreads and
yield spreads
This figure shows the evolution of euro volume (V OL), the relative volume ratio (RV OL), the bid-ask
spreads (BAS) and the yield spreads (Y LS) at daily frequency for the whole sample (excluding Germany)
between April 2003 to December 2014. The first graph shows daily volume. The euro volume is calculated
from notional amounts and trade prices for all trades that occur on MTS. The volume of all trades at a
particular day is then summed across all bonds in the sample (excluding Germany) to arrive at the sample
volume. The second graph shows the relative volume ratio, which is calculated as the difference between the
logarithm of current volume and the average of the logarithm of volume in the previous five days, as follows:
RV OLt = log(V OLt)− 15
5∑
l=1
log(V OLt−l).
The third graph shows yield spreads. The yield spread is calculated as the difference between 10-year
constant maturity yields of Germany and the respective country divided by the German yield and then
aggregated to the sample level using volume weighting (based on the last 20 trading days). The 10-year
constant maturity yields are estimated from the cross-section of bonds in a country using the Nelson and
Siegel (1987) method. The fourth graph shows relative bid-ask spreads. For each quote (we observe each
quote update of best bid- and ask prices) the bid-ask spread is calculated as the difference between the best
ask price and the best bid price divided by the mid price (average of bid and ask price). The daily bid-ask
spread is calculated as an equally weighted average across all the quotes (for a particular bond). Next the
daily sample bid-ask spread is calculated as volume weighted average (based on the last 20 trading days)
across all bonds.
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Figure 6: Relative volume, bid-ask spread and yield spread in event time
This figure shows the evolution of the average relative volume ratio, the abnormal bid-ask spread and the
abnormal yield spread (calculated as the difference between the value of the variable at a particular day in the
event window and the five day average from τ = −10 to τ = 6) for events as defined by the threshold model
with κ = 1.0 and κDE = −0.75 over the event window from τ = −2 to τ = 5. The relative volume ratio, yield
spreads and bid-ask spreads are calculated as described in Figure 5 (Note here the aggregation takes place
on the country level). The red solid line represents the mean of the variable of interest calculated from the
actual events and the blue line represents the means calculated from 15 random (placebo) events (resampled
200 times). The grey shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals (calculated using standard errors obtained
with the cross-sectional approach). From left to right the figure shows the graphs for different variables:
volume ratio RV OL (left), bid-ask spread BAS (middle) and yield spread Y LS (right). From top to the
bottom we plot different sets of events. The graphs at the top show the average for all events. In the middle
and at the bottom we show graphs for high and low bid-ask spread events. We split events according to the
bid-ask spread at the event day. If the bid-ask spread is below (above) the median bid-ask-spread across all
events in a country it is classified as low (high) bid-ask spread event.
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Figure 7: Platform Comparison
The graphs show volume and the bid-ask spread for the European Bond Market E (blue) and the domestic
bond market D (grey) around our events for the threshold model with a κ of 2. The first graph shows
the mean daily aggregated trading volume at the bond level in both markets. The time series is smoothed
using an MA(3). The dashed lines are placebo lines (P) based on 200 randomly sampled events (20 for each
country). The Second graph plots the difference of the bid-ask spreads in the domestic and EBM market.
The difference between the bid-ask spreads is smoothed using an MA(3). The straight lines represent the
pre (post) event mean of the difference (grey/dark blue).
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics events
Panel A shows the frequency of each type of event for the different countries. We define events by using
a threshold model which defines events as days where both the decrease in the German yield is below a
certain threshold and the increase in the yield of the corresponding country is above a certain threshold (at
the same time). The thresholds are calculated as the product of past volatility of yield changes and the
parameter κ (i.e., zm,t = κ × σt). For Germany we use a fixed κDE of -0.75, while for the other countries
we use different values (κ is either 1.0, 1.5 or 2.0). Panel B shows descriptive statistics for the volume ratio
(RV OL), the bid-ask spreads (BAS) and the yield spreads (Y LS), defined as in Table 2. The statistics in
Panel B are only calculated for the event period between τ = −2 and τ = 5 (event time) around the events.
Panel A: Number of events per country
κ = 2.0 κ = 1.5 κ = 1.0
Austria 1 3 6
Beligium 4 11 20
Spain 15 27 51
Finland 2 2 3
France 0 1 5
Greece 21 27 38
Ireland 11 21 38
Italy 17 24 50
Netherlands 2 2 2
Portugal 11 20 32
Total 84 138 245
Panel B: Descriptive statistics event periods
mean median sd semean min max count
RVOL TM κ = 1.0 -0.1412 -0.0311 1.0986 0.0248 -5.4991 4.5819 1960
RVOL TM κ = 1.5 -0.1880 -0.0879 1.1406 0.0343 -5.4991 4.5819 1104
RVOL TM κ = 2.0 -0.2676 -0.1198 1.1602 0.0448 -4.5347 4.4798 672
BAS TM κ = 1.0 1.7016 0.7178 2.9548 0.0667 0.0175 44.385 1960
BAS TM κ = 1.5 2.0100 0.8651 3.0864 0.0929 0.0181 44.385 1104
BAS TM κ = 2.0 2.3818 0.9731 3.6473 0.1407 0.0181 44.385 672
YLS TM κ = 1.0 1.7921 1.4572 1.7548 0.0396 -0.5063 18.708 1960
YLS TM κ = 1.5 1.8021 1.5815 1.6388 0.0493 -0.5063 17.619 1104
YLS TM κ = 2.0 1.8320 1.5538 1.7790 0.0686 -0.5063 17.619 672
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Table 4: Market Stress, Trading Volume and Liquidity
Panel A contains the results of the event study for different measures of market stress. The event window
starts at τ = −2 and lasts until τ = 5. Events are defined as explained in table 3 according to the threshold
model. As a measure for abnormal volume the relative volume ratio RV OL as defined in Table 2 is used.
Panel B is based on the threshold model with a κ = 1 and contains the results for abnormal volume and
bid-ask spreads for two subgroups (a high and a low bid ask spread group). We split events according to
the bid-ask spread at the event day. If the bid-ask spread is below (above) the median bid-ask-spread across
all events in a country it is classified as low (high) bid-ask spread event. The top of Panel B contains the
result for the RV OL. The first (second) row contains the result for the high (low) bid-ask spread group.
The third row shows the difference between the abnormal volume in the two groups. The bottom of Panel
B contains the abnormal value of the bid-ask spreads BAS during the event window for both groups and
the difference between the two groups. The abnormal bid-ask spread is calculated as the difference between
the bid-ask spread in a given day in the event window and the average bid-ask spread in the [-10,-6] period.
Each entry in this table contains two values: point estimates and t-statistics calculated based on standard
errors from the cross-sectional approach (in brackets). ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: RVOL for different flight measures
TM κ = 2.0 -0.080 -0.057 -0.180 -0.336** -0.381*** -0.335*** -0.404*** -0.369***
(-0.75) (-0.52) (-1.32) (-2.45) (-2.75) (-2.83) (-3.08) (-2.83)
TM κ = 1.5 -0.067 0.038 -0.052 -0.167 -0.253** -0.298*** -0.379*** -0.326***
(-0.77) (0.49) (-0.55) (-1.55) (-2.52) (-2.97) (-3.52) (-3.41)
TM κ = 1.0 -0.020 0.025 0.043 -0.176** -0.269*** -0.253*** -0.238*** -0.242***
(-0.35) (0.44) (0.64) (-2.24) (-3.62) (-3.38) (-3.06) (-3.53)
Panel B: RVOL and abnormal BAS for high and low bid-ask spread Events (TM κ = 1.0)
HS RV OL -0.120 -0.024 -0.147 -0.422*** -0.524*** -0.553*** -0.374*** -0.443***
(-1.48) (-0.26) (-1.30) (-3.54) (-4.31) (-4.84) (-3.17) (-4.03)
LS RV OL 0.077 0.072 0.229*** 0.065 -0.020 0.039 -0.106 -0.046
(0.96) (1.04) (3.19) (0.66) (-0.25) (0.43) (-1.05) (-0.58)
Difference -0.197* -0.096 -0.376*** -0.487*** -0.504*** -0.593*** -0.268* -0.397***
(-1.73) (-0.85) (-2.83) (-3.17) (-3.46) (-4.07) (-1.73) (-2.95)
HS BAS 0.215*** 0.132*** 0.911*** 0.967*** 0.816*** 0.789*** 0.813*** 0.751***
(5.58) (3.04) (11.58) (10.59) (9.24) (8.55) (9.30) (10.02)
LS BAS 0.025 0.098*** 0.275*** 0.454*** 0.285*** 0.308*** 0.347*** 0.340***
(0.75) (3.22) (5.80) (7.54) (4.28) (5.12) (5.06) (5.42)
Difference 0.190*** 0.034 0.636*** 0.512*** 0.531*** 0.481*** 0.465*** 0.411***
(3.72) (0.64) (6.96) (4.71) (4.82) (4.39) (4.20) (4.22)
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Table 5: Market Stress, Trading Volume and Liquidity - Countrygroup results
In this table we display the results of the event study (executed as described in Table 4) for two country
groups. The first group contains all events that occur in a GIIPS country (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal or
Spain) and the second group contains all events that occur in a CORE country (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France and the Netherlands). The top of the table contains the results for abnormal volume (based on the
relative volume ratio RV OL as defined in Table 2) for the two subgroups. The bottom of the table contains
the results for abnormal bid-ask spreads (calculated as described in Table 4 from bid-ask spreads calculated
as described in Table 2) for the two subgroups. Each entry in this table contains two values: point estimates
and t-statistics calculated based on standard errors from the cross-sectional approach (in brackets). ***,**,*
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
GIIPS RVOL -0.051 0.016 0.003 -0.199** -0.305*** -0.269*** -0.246*** -0.274***
(-0.82) (0.28) (0.04) (-2.43) (-3.85) (-3.36) (-2.95) (-3.76)
CORE RVOL 0.157 0.079 0.277 -0.040 -0.059 -0.165 -0.194 -0.054
(1.05) (0.40) (1.40) (-0.17) (-0.28) (-0.76) (-0.89) (-0.28)
DIF -0.208 -0.063 -0.274 -0.159 -0.246 -0.104 -0.052 -0.220
(-1.28) (-0.39) (-1.44) (-0.72) (-1.17) (-0.49) (-0.24) (-1.14)
GIIPS BAS 0.003** 0.003** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(2.46) (2.21) (4.42) (5.19) (3.44) (3.27) (3.81) (3.67)
CORE BAS 0.000 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002**
(0.66) (1.35) (2.88) (3.24) (2.56) (2.90) (3.21) (2.37)
DIF 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.007* 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.95) (0.75) (1.30) (1.69) (0.99) (0.97) (0.95) (1.04)
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Table 6: Results cross-sectional regressions
This table contains results from estimating the following regression equation using ordinary least squares
(OLS):
RV OL = αc + βBAS+γY LS +
K∑
k=1
δkControl + u,
where RV OL is the relative volume ratio, BAS is volume weighted relative bid-ask spread and Y LS is
the volume weighted yield spread (calculated as described in Table 2) in the country in which the event
takes place on a particular day in the event window. Panel A shows the results for the levels and Panel
B for the first differences. Specification (1)-(3) are estimated without control variables while specification
(4)-(6) contain the full set of control variables. The control variables include dummies for the country, the
weekday and the month as well as indicator variables for EU wide macroeconomic announcements (CPI,
Employment GDP) and for ECB monetary policy decisions (change of main refinancing rate). For brevity
we only display the coefficients of the bid-ask spread and the yield spread. N is the number of observations.
Standard errors are clustered at the event level. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
κ = 1.0 κ = 1.5 κ = 2.0 κ = 1.0 κ = 1.5 κ = 2.0
Panel A: Cross-sectional Regressions Results Levels
BAS -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.122*** -0.092*** -0.098*** -0.107***
(-3.88) (-3.49) (-3.53) (-3.95) (-3.38) (-2.95)
YLS 0.114*** 0.145*** 0.174*** 0.136*** 0.163*** 0.170***
(4.11) (3.91) (3.80) (4.83) (4.08) (3.50)
N 1960 1104 672 1960 1104 672
adjusted R2 0.046 0.059 0.113 0.172 0.213 0.282
Panel B: Cross-sectional Regressions Results First Differences
∆BAS -0.023** -0.026** -0.019 -0.034*** -0.037*** -0.029***
(-2.08) (-2.32) (-1.61) (-3.18) (-3.36) (-2.69)
∆YLS 0.023 0.037 0.009 0.045 0.053* 0.011
(0.64) (1.20) (0.27) (1.12) (1.69) (0.32)
N 1960 1104 672 1960 1104 672.000
adjusted R2 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.137 0.166 0.222
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Weekday No No No Yes Yes Yes
Month No No No Yes Yes Yes
Macro No No No Yes Yes Yes
Monetary No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Share of Domestic Market Makers
The table shows the share of market makers by their nationality for each of the 10 domestic MTS markets.
The calculations are based on the participant lists published on the MTS website on November 21, 2016.
The rows of the Table contain the market while the columns contain the market maker nationality. For
example column one shows the number of Austrian market makers in the MTS domestic market indicated
in each row. The first row splits market makers in Austria by their nationality. The mean is calculated
across all column-wise. The difference is calculated as the difference between the share of domestic market
makers and the mean. The t-value assesses the statistical significance. The standard deviation is calculated
column-wise.
AT BE ES FI FR GR IE IT NL PT
AT 8.33% 0.00% 8.33% 0.00% 16.7% 0.00% 0.00% 4.17% 4.17% 0.00%
BE 0.00% 4.55% 4.55% 0.00% 18.2% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 13.6% 0.00%
ES 0.00% 0.00% 29.2% 0.00% 20.8% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
FI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 15.0% 0.00% 0.00% 5.00% 5.0% 0.00%
FR 0.00% 0.00% 8.70% 0.00% 17.4% 0.00% 0.00% 8.70% 4.35% 0.00%
GR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 14.3% 14.3% 0.00% 4.76% 4.76% 0.00%
IE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 15.0% 0.00% 5.00% 0.00% 5.00% 0.00%
IT 0.00% 0.00% 6.90% 0.00% 13.79% 0.00% 0.00% 24.1% 3.45% 0.00%
NL 0.00% 0.00% 9.09% 4.55% 18.2% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 13.6% 0.00%
PT 0.00% 0.00% 8.00% 0.00% 16.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.00% 20.0%
mean 0.83% 0.45% 7.47% 1.45% 16.53% 1.43% 0.50% 4.68% 5.80% 2.00%
Diff 7.50% 4.09% 21.69% 8.55% 0.86% 12.9% 4.50% 19.5% 7.84% 18.0%
t-value 3.00 3.00 2.69 2.71 0.42 3.00 3.00 2.74 1.89 3.00
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Table 8: Difference-in-Difference - Bond Level
This table contains the point estimates of the coefficients as well as the t-statistics (in parenthesis) from
estimating the following regression,
Yb,p,t = αb,e + ατ + β DOMp + γDOMp × postτ +
K∑
k=1
δkControlb,p,t + ub,p,t,
using OLS. We consider 21 days around our events (from τ = -10 to +10), where the sample events (denoted
by e) are defined by our threshold model with varying κ’s. We only consider events for which we observe
quotes on both the international and the domestic MTS platform. Additionally we require active trading
for at least three dates per platform to include the platform volume for a particular event. The dependent
variable is the euro volume (V OLb,p,t) or the bid-ask spread (BASb,p,t) of bond b, on platform p at day t
(which corresponds to an event e at event time τ). The volume is expressed in millions EUR divided by 10
and bid-ask spreads are expressed in % times 10. The variable post is an indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 after the event and 0 before the event. The variable treatment takes the value of 1 for the domestic
market and 0 for the EBM market. Specification (1) to (3) are without control variables while specification
(4) to (6) contain the full set of control variables. The control variables are as defined in Table 6 and include
additionally the minimum price tick. The specification also contains Bond×Event fixed effects and event
time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered around events. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
κ = 1.0 κ = 1.5 κ = 2.0 κ = 1.0 κ = 1.5 κ = 2.0
Panel A: Results for EUR Volume
Post -0.032** -0.085*** -0.081***
(-2.49) (-3.18) (-2.89)
DOM 1.862*** 1.788*** 2.018*** 3.408*** 3.491*** 3.820***
(13.94) (9.42) (7.38) (17.76) (10.92) (8.89)
DOM × Post -0.254*** -0.441*** -0.429*** -0.249*** -0.453*** -0.439***
(-3.71) (-4.85) (-3.77) (-3.33) (-4.27) (-3.29)
N 163,149 81,900 53,739 163,149 81,900 53,739
R2 0.042 0.034 0.039 0.314 0.310 0.334
Panel B: Results for Bid-Ask Spreads
Post 2.616*** 4.002*** 4.640***
(7.48) (6.46) (5.00)
DOM 3.823*** 5.028*** 5.467*** -0.458*** -0.534*** -0.677***
(8.54) (6.12) (5.33) (-4.56) (-2.95) (-3.06)
DOM × Post 0.832*** 0.770** 0.882* 0.716*** 0.808** 1.128***
(4.24) (2.19) (1.87) (3.71) (2.34) (2.68)
N 163,149 81,900 53,739 163,149 81,900 53,739
R2 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.615 0.592 0.588
Minpricetick NO NO NO YES YES YES
Macro Dummy NO NO NO YES YES YES
Monetary Dummy NO NO NO YES YES YES
Month Dummies NO NO NO YES YES YES
Dow Dummies NO NO NO YES YES YES
Bond×Event FE NO NO NO YES YES YES
Event Time FE NO NO NO YES YES YES
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics time series regressions
This table contains descriptive statistics for the time series of the aggregate volume (sample), the VSTOXX,
bank CDS spreads, the Libor-OIS, the Euro-to-US Dollar exchange rate and the returns of the EuroStoxx50
between April 2003 and December 2014. The euro volume is calculated from notional amounts and trade
prices for all trades that occur on MTS. The volume of all trades at a particular day is then summed across
all bonds in the sample (excluding Germany) to arrive at the sample volume. The Libor-OIS spread is
calculated as the difference between the EUR 3-Month London Interbank Offering Rate and the middle rate
of the EUR 3-Month Overnight Index Swap (EONIA Swap). The European Bank Sector Credit Default
Swap Index represents the 5-year CDS-premium of major European banks and is based on data from Credit
Market Analysis (CMA). The VSTOXX is a volatility index that is calculated from the implied volatility of
EuroStoxx50 index options. EuroStoxx50 returns are calculated from Index close prices assuming continuous
compounding. The Euro-to-US Dollar exchange rate is the Reuters closing spot middle rate. All of this data
is retrieved from DataStream.
mean median sd semean min max count
VOL EUR bn 7.383 7.123 3.343 0.062 0.513 23.387 2957
BAS % 0.132 0.081 0.169 0.003 0.016 2.914 2957
YLS - 0.434 0.155 0.515 0.010 -0.001 2.126 2957
LOIS % 0.260 0.095 0.319 0.006 -0.015 1.953 2957
BCDS % 1.576 1.275 1.430 0.027 0.074 6.064 2799
VSTOXX /100 0.233 0.212 0.092 0.002 0.116 0.875 2957
EQRET % 0.010 0.052 1.207 0.022 -9.001 10.219 2957
FXUSD - 0.761 0.761 0.054 0.001 0.626 0.924 2957
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Table 11: Time series regressions - First differences
This table contains the point estimates of the coefficients as well as the t-statistics (in parenthesis) from
estimating the following regression,
RV OLt = α+ β∆Y LSt + γ∆BASt +
K∑
k=1
δkControlk,t + ut,
using OLS. The sample consists of the entire time series between April 2003 and December 2014. The
dependent variable is the relative volume ratio (RV OL) which is explained by the volume weighted yield
spread (Y LS) and the volume weighted bid-ask spread (BAS) which are calculated as described before in
Table 2. From specification (1) to (5) we continuously add additional control variables. N is the number
of observations. Standard errors are calculated using the method of Newey and West (1987) with 7 lags.
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆BAS -22.323*** -29.296*** -29.185*** -28.529*** -28.527*** -28.202***
(-2.71) (-3.25) (-3.24) (-3.22) (-3.22) (-3.26)
∆YLS 0.288* 0.380** 0.376** 0.370** 0.370** 0.401**
(1.88) (2.19) (2.17) (2.14) (2.14) (2.31)
N 2956 2956 2956 2956 2956 2956
Day of the week NO YES YES YES YES YES
Macro announcements NO NO YES YES YES YES
Monetary policy NO NO NO YES YES YES
Month of the year NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time trend NO NO NO NO NO YES
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